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RECALIBRATING THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM: 
REMOVING SYSTEMATIC PROCEDURAL BARRIERS FROM 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
Brandon Kenney* 
A powerful explosion ripped through the Upper Big Branch coal 
mine on an April afternoon in 2010.1  The blast sent an inferno 
through two and one-half miles of underground mines 1,000 feet be-
low the surface, killing twenty-nine coal miners instantaneously.2  This 
tragedy was horrific, but coal miners dying from a preventable dis-
ease, coal workers’ pneumoconiosis—more commonly known as 
black lung disease—eclipse the single tragedy’s death toll every year.3  
And as the death toll rose, the underpinning due process rights af-
forded to black lung claimants eroded. 
Black lung disease afflicts miners when they breathe excess 
amounts of coal dust, causing nodules to form in their lungs.4  This 
formation process causes internal scarring and stiffness, slowly reduc-
ing lung function and making breathing difficult.5  Miners suffering 
from the disease are overexerted with even the simplest tasks, such as 
walking up stairs.6  While black lung disease can, and indeed must be 
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 1 GOVERNOR’S INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH 4 (2011), 
http://www.nttc.edu/programs&
projects/minesafety/disasterinvestigations/upperbigbranch/UpperBigBranchReport.pdf 
[hereinafter INVESTIGATION PANEL]  
 2 Id. 
 3 Kentucky journalists may have best illustrated the sheer size of the problem facing min-
ers: “It’s as if the Titanic sank every year, and no ships came to the rescue.  While that 
long-ago disaster continues to fascinate the nation, the miners slip into cold, early graves 
almost unnoticed.”  Gardiner Harris & Ralph Dunlop, Dust, Deception & Death:  Why Black 
Lung Hasn’t Been Wiped Out, COURIER-J., http://archive.courier-
journal.com/cjextra/dust/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 4 See Michael D. Attfield & Gregory R. Wagner, Respiratory Disease in Coal Miners, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 413, 413 (William N. Rom, ed., 3d ed. 1998) 
(describing the medical causes of black lung disease and the disease’s physical impact). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 427–28. 
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prevented under federal regulations,7 its prevalence is increasing 
among coal miners,8 especially younger miners.9  Between the 1980s 
and the early 2000s, prevalence of the most severe form of the disease 
tripled, reaching levels similar to the early 1970s.10  Of the twenty-
nine miners who died in the Upper Big Branch disaster, for example, 
only twenty-four had examinable tissue.11  Seventeen of those twenty-
four had black lung disease and four others showed the early signs of 
developing it.12 
In 1969, Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act, the first congressional enactment exclusively providing workers’ 
compensation benefits for victims of a specific occupational disease.13  
Congress has altered the Black Lung Benefits Program (“the Pro-
gram”), the workers’ compensation scheme allowing miners with 
black lung disease to claim benefits, numerous times during the in-
tervening decades.14  The Program, however, has failed to provide a 
fair adjudicative forum for claimants. 
Black lung benefits claimants’ success rates have been decreasing 
for the last decade.15  In 2012, that rate hit a low of 14% success on 
 
 7 The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (“1969 Act") limits the concentra-
tion of coal dust in underground mines and sets out guidelines for regularly testing the 
concentration.  Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 
§ 202, 83 Stat. 742, 760–61 (1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–964 (2006)).  
Concentration levels can be controlled through the use of proper ventilation, personal 
dust masks, dust collectors, and water sprays.  Id. § 202(a), (h). 
 8 David J. Blackley et al., Letter to the Editor, Resurgence of a Debilitating and Entirely Prevent-
able Respiratory Disease Among Working Coal Miners, 190 AM. J. OF RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL 
CARE MED. 708, 708–09 (2014). 
 9 Id. 
 10 A. Scott Laney & Michael D. Attfield, Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis and Progressive Massive 
Fibrosis are Increasingly More Prevalent Among Workers in Small Underground Coal Mines in the 
United States, 67 OCCUP. & ENVTL. MED. 428, 429 (2010) (noting the increase of black 
lung disease among miners, especially those in smaller underground coal mines). 
 11 INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 1, at 32. 
 12 Id.  The youngest of the seventeen found with black lung was only twenty-five years old.  
Id. 
 13 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. STANDARDS ADMIN., BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972:  
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1974 AND 
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1973, at 5 (1975) (discussing the 
uniqueness of the program compared to other workers’ compensation schemes). 
 14 For a detailed examination of the legislative history of the Program prior to the 1990s, see 
Jonathan P. Nase, The Surprising Cost of Benefits:  The Legislative History of the Federal Black 
Lung Benefits Program, 4 J. MINERAL L. & POL’Y 277 (1988–89); Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. 
Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program:  Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. 
REV. 665 (1989). 
 15 See Chris Hamby, ‘Breathless and Burdened’ Will Examine Coal Industry’s Efforts to Defeat Black 
Lung Benefits Claims, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2013/10/28/13620/breathless-and-burdened-will-examine-coal-
industrys-efforts-defeat-black-lung (describing the continued decrease in claimants’ suc-
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initial claims,16 with only half of those initial awards likely to result in 
permanent benefits after hearings and appeals.17  While claimants’ 
low success rate does not independently demonstrate problems with 
the Program, it does prompt the need for further study to determine 
whether there are barriers inherent in the structure of the Program 
process that disfavor certain claimants and result in unjust adjudica-
tions violating basic due process rights accorded to litigants regard-
less even during administrative proceedings.18 
This Comment argues that there are systematic barriers in the 
Black Lung Benefits Program that hinder the fair representation of 
miners’ claims for workers’ compensation benefits.  In Part I, I will 
briefly discuss the Program’s history, from the 1969 Act to the recent 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) guidelines increasing miners’ access 
to medical evidence, and then outline how the current benefits claim 
process works.  Part II will focus on two aspects of the current Pro-
gram that violate due process norms and create barriers to the fair 
determination of claims:  the lack of adequate miner legal represen-
tation and claimants’ lack of access to medical expert evidence.19 
Part III will offer solutions to erode these procedural barriers.20  
First, allowing miners and operators to settle claims would likely lead 
to an increase in claimant representation.  Such a settlement provi-
sion would address attorneys’ concerns that the process is too costly, 
 
cess rates); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-7, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 
PROGRAM:  ADMINISTRATIVE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES COULD IMPROVE MINERS’ ABILITY 
TO PURSUE CLAIMS 26 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009 REPORT] (providing a detailed anal-
ysis of claimants’ success rates prior to 2009). 
 16 Hamby, supra note 15. 
 17 The most recent information on success rates post-appeal is from the GAO 2009 Report, 
which found the final award rate in 2008 to be approximately half the initial reward rate.  
GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 15, at 26. 
 18 The Federal Courts of Appeals have previously addressed due process concerns in the 
Black Lung Program context.  See, e.g., Fox ex rel. Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co., 739 F.3d 131, 
133 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the coal company’s failure to disclose relevant medical 
evidence did not demonstrate fraud on the court or a due process violation, but was 
“hardly admirable”); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
400 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying employer’s argument that due process rights vio-
lated by delay in naming responsible operator); Strike v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 817 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1987) (ruling on the Secretary of Labor’s ability to apply 
interim medical standards under Section 902(f)(2) of the Black Lung Benefits Act). 
 19 Although other aspects of the Program may create an unfair procedural barrier to claim-
ants, such as the lengthy backlog of claims, this paper will focus solely on problems aris-
ing from representation and medical evidence disparities between parties. 
 20 The Secretary of Labor has full authority to implement new regulations and guidelines to 
address these very due process concerns concerning evidentiary disparity.  See Nat’l Min-
ing Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (interpreting 30 U.S.C. §§ 
902(f)(1), 932(a)). 
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lengthy, and uncertain by making a potentially inexpensive and short 
proceeding possible.  By increasing representation, claimants will 
have a better chance of clearly articulating their legal position, both 
in settlement discussions and hearings.  Second, I will argue that 
there should be a presumption of disclosing all medical expert evi-
dence, even non-testifying expert evidence, between parties before 
hearings.  This would increase claimants’ access to medical expert ev-
idence without placing any additional financial costs on either party.  
The Comment will conclude by emphasizing that these are im-
portant, but preliminary steps toward removing systematic procedural 
barriers from Program proceedings. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM 
A disaster similar to the explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine 
spurred support for what would become the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969.21  After the explosion, miners were 
outraged with the lack of state and federal oversight of underground 
mining operations.22  Congressional leadership, many of whom were 
from traditional coal mining states, successfully passed the bill, with-
standing substantial opposition from the executive branch.23  These 
efforts resulted in an enormous expansion of health and safety regu-
lations affecting the mining industry, but also included the initial it-
eration of the Black Lung Benefits Program providing workers’ com-
pensation benefits to coal miners suffering from black lung disease.24 
A. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the Black 
Lung Benefits Program 
The 1969 Act actually created two benefits programs, one admin-
istered by the Social Security Administration and another overseen by 
 
 21 The similar explosion took place in 1968 outside Farmington, West Virginia and killed 
seventy-eight miners.  See H.R. REP. NO. 91-563 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2503, 2503 (citing the disaster as a reason for enacting the 1969 Act). 
 22 See ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG:  ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER, at xii (1998) 
(discussing the social movements and forceful advocacy that “fostered advances in recog-
nition of coal workers’ lung disorders”). 
 23 In 1969, legislators from mining states held multiple important congressional positions.  
For example, Robert Byrd of West Virginia was the Senate Majority Whip, Hugh Scott of 
Pennsylvania was the Senate Minority Leader, and Carl Perkins of Kentucky was the Chair 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor.  For a detailed analysis of the effort to 
pass the 1969 Act and President Richard Nixon’s attempts to derail its passage, see Nase, 
supra note 14, at 290 & n.83. 
 24 Id. at 282. 
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the DOL.25  Compromising in order to include any benefits program 
in the 1969 Act, Congress created one program under Part B of the 
legislation for miners who filed requests before 1973 to claim benefits 
funded by the federal government.26  Part C of the 1969 Act created 
the other program, which is now known as the Black Lung Benefits 
Program, covering all claims filed from 1973 onward.27 
Benefits claimed under Part C of the 1969 Act were funded by a 
miner’s last employer, or if the mine operator no longer existed, fed-
eral funds.28  If successful, a claimant was entitled to medical care and 
a certain percentage of his former pay.29  In order to successfully gain 
benefits, the 1969 Act required a claimant to establish:  (1) he had 
pneumoconiosis; (2) the disease had arisen at least in part out of his 
coal mining employment; (3) he was totally disabled from perform-
ing his normal coal mining work; and (4) the disease was a contrib-
uting cause of the total disability.30  To establish the existence of black 
lung disease, claimants could use medical expert opinions, other 
medical evidence such as chest x-rays or biopsy reports, or invoke 
statutory presumptions.31 
The 1969 Act included three statutory presumptions.  If a claim-
ant had worked in an underground coal mine for at least fifteen 
years, or had worked at least fifteen years in a mine before dying, and 
could show he suffered from black lung disease, then the disease was 
presumed to have arisen out of mining employment.32  Also, if a med-
ical examiner found a specific type of mass in a claimant’s X-ray, then 
 
 25 The 1969 Act, Pub. L. No. 91–173, §§ 413(b), 421(a), 83 Stat. 742, 794–95 (codified at 30 
U.S.C. §§ 923(b), 931(a) (1969)). 
 26 Id. § 414(a), 83 Stat. 795 (codified at § 923(a)). 
 27 Id. § 421(a), 83 Stat. 795 (codified at § 931(a)). 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. § 412(a)(1), 83 Stat. 794 (codified at § 922(a)(1)).  Benefit pay is currently based on 
37.5% of the minimum monthly payment to a federal employee who is a Grade GS-2 on 
the federal pay scale.  30 U.S.C. § 922.  As of January 2014, this is approximately $631.78 
per month, although it is increased if the miner has dependents.  See OFFICE OF PERS. 
MGMT., 2014 GENERAL SCHEDULE (GS) LOCALITY PAY TABLES (2014), available at 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2014/general-
schedule. 
 30 The 1969 Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 422(h), 83 Stat. 797 (codified at § 932(h)).  The Sec-
retary of Labor, however, currently has the authority to establish the medical criteria to 
determine proof of total disability.  See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 
869 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (interpreting 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(f)(1), 932(a)). 
 31 The 1969 Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 411(c), 83 Stat. 793 (codified at § 921(c)). 
 32 Id. 
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the claimant was also presumed to have the disease.33  All of these 
presumptions were rebuttable by the mine operator.34 
The process for claiming benefits under Part C was largely incor-
porated from the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act.35  While the claim process has changed slightly since the 1969 
Act, the present process is significantly similar.  Currently, a miner 
files a claim with a district director, who makes the initial decision of 
whether to award benefits.36  In making this decision, the director re-
lies on the claimant’s complete medical history, previous mining em-
ployment, and a DOL-arranged pulmonary examination with a physi-
cian’s diagnosis and medical opinion.37  If there is an identifiable 
mine operator that would be liable for benefits under Part C, the op-
erator may submit evidence objecting to its liability and the claimant 
may produce additional evidence supporting his claim.38 
After the district director makes a decision whether to award ben-
efits, either party may request a hearing with an Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”).39  If the director awarded the claimant benefits, that 
miner is awarded interim benefits through a separate fund.40  If the 
claimant is eventually successful after a hearing or appeal, the liable 
operator is responsible for reimbursing the interim benefits as well as 
providing future benefits.41  After the ALJ hearing, either party can 
appeal the decision to the Benefits Review Board, whose decision can 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. § 422(a) (codified at § 932(a)).  Notably, although the Longshore and Harbor Work-
ers’ Compensation Act’s procedural components were mostly incorporated, the 1969 Act 
did not incorporate the Longshoremen’s Act’s settlement provision.  Instead, the 1969 
Act specifically prohibited those provisions.  30 U.S.C. § 932(a); see also Ramey v. Dir., Of-
fice of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 326 F.3d 474, 476–77 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the 
1969 Act did not incorporate the settlement provisions from the Longshoremen’s Act). 
 36 20 C.F.R. § 725.401 (2014).  The statute of limitations under 30 U.S.C. § 932(f) (codified 
at 20 C.F.R. § 725.308) applies both to initial and subsequent claims, although significant 
events may re-toll the pertinent timing.  Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Amick, No. 04-1147, 
2004 WL 2791653, at **1–4 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2004); Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Kirk, 
264 F.3d 602, 606–08 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 37 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.404, 406, 414. 
 38 Id. § 725.456.  Even if there is a significant delay in identifying the employer responsible, 
courts have held this does not constitute a due process violation. See Roberts & Schaefer 
Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 400 F.3d 992, 996–98 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(denying employer’s argument that due process rights were violated by delay in naming 
responsible operator). 
 39 20 C.F.R. § 725.450. 
 40 Id. § 725.483. 
 41 Id. § 725.420. 
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be further appealed to a Federal Court of Appeals and then to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.42 
B.  The Early Amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Act 
The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 was the first of the four ma-
jor amendments to the Program.43  The 1972 Amendment, spurred by 
a concern that the agencies were denying too many claims,44 expand-
ed coverage of the 1969 Act to include surface miners operating in 
similar conditions to underground coal mines.45  Congress also ex-
panded eligible claimants to incorporate orphaned children.46  In 
addition to expanding the reach of the Program’s benefits coverage, 
the 1972 Amendment added a new provision presuming that a miner 
claiming benefits who had spent at least 15 years mining had black 
lung disease, regardless of a negative chest X-ray, as long as the miner 
also showed other signs of the disease.47 
Congress again amended the Program under the 1977 Black Lung 
Benefits Revenue Act to transfer more financial responsibility to coal 
companies for subsidizing claimants’ benefits.48  The 1977 Revenue 
Act created the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, which was funded 
from a tax levied on operators based on the amount of coal pro-
duced.49  If the district director responsible for a claimant’s initial de-
termination found that no coal mine operator was responsible for 
paying the claimant’s benefits or if the responsible operator was de-
 
 42 Id. § 725.481–82. 
 43 BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as amended 
at 30 U.S.C. § 922 (2000)) [hereinafter 1972 Amendment]. 
 44 See S. REP. NO. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2307 (reporting that 
the rate of denial “suggests strongly that the solution has not been nearly as complete as 
Congress believed and expected it would be.”). 
 45 1972 Amendment, supra note 43, at § 153 (codified as amended in various sections of 30 
U.S.C.). 
 46 Id. § 150 (codified at § 922). 
 47 Id. § 154 (codified at § 921). 
 48 BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVENUE ACT OF 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1978)) [hereinafter 1977 Revenue Act].  Congress also passed the 1977 
Black Lung Benefit’s Reform Act, which made the 1969 Act’s Part C benefits program a 
permanent workers’ compensation program.  BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REFORM ACT OF 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 932).  The Program was ini-
tially intended to only last until the mid-1970s, however, Congress’ 1969 projections that 
states would provide similar schemes and that black lung disease would mostly be elimi-
nated did not materialize.  See H.R. REP. NO. 91-563, supra note 21, at 14, reprinted in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2516. 
 49 1977 Revenue Act, supra note 48, at §§ 2, 3. 
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funct, money from the Trust Fund would fund the workers’ compen-
sation benefits.50 
The 1977 Amendment also altered the attorney’s fee provision to 
its current form.  An attorney’s fee is now contingent on the success-
ful reward of benefits; otherwise, the attorney is not permitted to seek 
any fees from the claimant.51  If benefits are awarded, then the mine 
company or the Trust Fund pays the attorney’s fees.52 
The Program steadily grew in the years following the 1977 
Amendment, both in terms of the number of claimants and cost to 
the federal government.  Between 1977 and 1981, the Program oper-
ated under a budget deficit of one and a half billion dollars.53  In di-
rect response to this increase in cost, Congress, under the Black Lung 
Benefits Revenue Act of 1981,54 repealed three former statutory pre-
sumptions.  First, there was no longer a presumption that a miner’s 
black lung disease arose out of mining employment if he could show 
signs of the disease and had worked in coal mines for fifteen years.55  
Furthermore, Congress made it more difficult for surviving spouses 
and dependents to collect benefits by eliminating all presumptions 
that the deceased miner suffered from black lung disease and requir-
ing a reapplication for the continuation of survivor’s benefits if the 
miner previously received them.56 
C.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Recent DOL Actions 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) 
reinstated much of what was eliminated from the Program in 1981.  
Under the ACA, a miner who has spent fifteen years working in coal 
mines and is able to prove he suffers from a disabling respiratory 
condition is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that black lung dis-
ease caused his full disability.57  The ACA also reinstated the automat-
 
 50 Id. § 2(d). 
 51 20 C.F.R. § 725.366. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-406, at 4 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2671, at 2673 (stating 
that the cumulative deficit between 1977 and 1981 totaled $1.5 billion and in 1981 alone 
totaled $522 million).  The rising cost of the Program was mostly due to continued bene-
fits being paid under Part B of the 1969 Act.  Id. 
 54 Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (2012)) 
[hereinafter 1981 Revenue Act]. 
 55 30 U.S.C. §§ 202(b), 203(a)(5). 
 56 Id. 
 57 PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 
119, 260 (2010) (amended as codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(4)). 
Oct. 2015] RECALIBRATING BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 337 
 
ic continuation of benefits to surviving dependents after a miner’s 
death and presumptions relating to survivor’s benefits.58 
Although there has not been any legislative action since the ACA, 
the DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in December of 
201259 and official guidance on Program operations to regional direc-
tors in February of 2014.60  The December 2012 Proposal is currently 
under review, and if promulgated in its proposed form would revise 
and reorganize the practice and procedures for administrative hear-
ings before ALJs to more closely resemble the current Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).61  The current administrative guidelines 
were closely modeled after the 1983 FRCP without substantial revi-
sion since.62  The new rule would adopt the FRCP with only slight 
modifications aimed at managing the specific types of cases that often 
come before the DOL ALJs, including black lung benefits disputes.63 
Patricia Smith, Solicitor of the DOL, also issued official guidelines 
in February of 2014, effective immediately, in an effort to combat the 
perceived unfair advantage of coal mine operators with superior re-
sources in administrative hearings.64  The 2014 Guidelines, which 
were issued in a memorandum to regional solicitors, outlined a pilot 
initiative for the Program to develop additional medical evidence and 
provide appellate support in a limited number of cases.65  The pilot 
program created a system for reviewing and developing additional 
medical evidence for certain black lung benefits claimants.  Only 
those pro se claimants that a district director initially awarded bene-
fits and have at least fifteen years of coal mining employment would 
qualify.66  If a mine operator contests the original medical evidence of 
 
 58 Id. § 1556 (codified at § 932(I)). 
 59 Rules of Practice and Procedure for Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law 
Judges, 77 Fed. Reg. 72142 (proposed Dec. 4, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 18) 
[hereinafter December 2012 Proposal]. 
 60 Letter from Patricia Smith, Solicitor, Dep’t of Labor, to Regional Solicitors, Black Lung 
Benefits Act Program Initiatives (Feb. 24, 2014), http://bit.ly/1ig9oVu [hereinafter 2014 
Guidelines]. 
 61 December 2012 Proposal, supra note 59, at 72142 (stating that the goal of the rule would 
be to “harmonize administrative hearing procedures with the current FRCP”). 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. (noting that occupational disease, whistleblower, and workplace retaliation claims re-
quire “more structured management and oversight by the presiding administrative law 
judge and more sophisticated motions and discovery procedures” than the current ALJ 
hearing rules and the FRCP provide). 
 64 2014 Guidelines, supra note 60. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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a qualifying claimant, then the DOL will provide an additional medi-
cal examination and opinion.67 
Most recently, the DOL has proposed a rule that would assist in 
giving miners greater access to their health records and assist in bal-
ancing the equities between coal miners and operators.  The pro-
posal would require the impacted parties, including employers, 
claimants, attorneys, and other representatives, to disclose to parties 
all medical information developed in connection with the benefits 
claim.68  The information disclosed would include medical evidence a 
party does not intend to submit as evidence at trial.69  The exact con-
tours of this rule and how it would determine what medical evidence 
would be covered is in flux as the rule is currently in the proposal 
stage at the time of writing.70  It is uncertain whether the rule will ex-
ist in any form, although based on the outline in the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking the rule would meaningfully assist miners in their 
information disparity compared to operators. 
II.  BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO THE 
FAIR ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS 
Congress’s and the DOL’s recent actions suggest their acknowl-
edgement that the Program’s current administrative hearing process 
unfairly disadvantages miners seeking benefits.  Comparing claim-
ants’ success rates in the past decade to the increase in the prevalence 
of the disease emphasizes the difficulty of defeating a mine operator’s 
objection to a benefit award.  From 2001 to 2012, for example, dis-
trict directors awarded initial benefits to claimants at rates of 15% or 
less,71 while studies during the same period noted a substantial in-
crease in the prevalence of black lung disease.72  If all other factors 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Black Lung Benefits Act:  Disclosure of Medical Information and Payment of Benefits, 
80 Fed. Reg. 23743 (proposed Apr. 29, 2015) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 725), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/04/29/2015-09573/black-lung-benefits-
act-disclosure-of-medical-information-and-payment-of-benefits. 
 69 Id. at 23748. 
 70 This proposal embodies parts of a significant overhaul of the Black Lung Benefits Pro-
gram that Senator Bob Casey and former Senator Jay Rockefeller had rallied for under 
the Black Lung Benefits Improvement Act of 2014 and its previous iterations.  The Sena-
tors’ bill, however, has never gained political traction.  See generally Brandon Kenney, Leg-
islative Changes May Improve the Black Lung Benefits Program, REGBLOG (Feb 2, 2015), 
http://www.regblog.org/2015/02/02/kenney_black_lung_act. 
 71 See GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 19, 2009; Hamby, supra note 15.  The success rates 
of claimants have slightly varied by year in the last decade, although the average annual 
success rate among claimants during that time is approximately thirteen percent.  Id. 
 72 Laney & Attfield, supra note 10, at 429. 
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were constant, one would reasonably expect the success rate to in-
crease if medical studies found an increase in a disease that almost 
exclusively affects coal miners. 
Low success rates, of course, do not necessarily support the infer-
ence that the process is unfair to claimants.  This evidence alone 
equally supports the assumption that too many claimants are applying 
for benefits without the proper qualifications and wasting resources 
that could be focused on more deserving claims.  Regardless of 
whether the low success rates accurately reflect the number of quali-
fied claimants it is clear that there are procedural aspects of the Pro-
gram that do unfairly give an advantage to mine operators contesting 
miners’ benefits claims.  While other administrative problems with 
the Program impact the fair determination of claims,73 this part will 
focus on issues arising from inadequate representation and claim-
ants’ lack of access to crucial medical evidence. 
A. Inadequate Representation for Black Lung Claimants 
The DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges advises claimants 
that adjudications in front of ALJs “vary widely in complexity and in 
many instances it may be wise to obtain legal counsel.”74  That the 
DOL believes it is important for claimants to have representation for 
Program proceedings, both initially and throughout the appeals pro-
cess, is apparent by this statement and the 1977 Amendment’s inclu-
sion of an attorney’s fee provision.75  The attorney’s fee provision has 
not been enough to entice lawyers to represent miners in front of 
 
 73 The immense backlog of cases pending in front of ALJs, for example, is one problem that 
causes claimants to wait, on average, three years to resolve a benefits claim.  GAO 2009 
Report, supra note 15, at 26.  In 2013, there were 11,325 cases, only part of which were 
Program claims pending in front of DOL ALJs, nearly double the number in the previous 
decade.  See Jim Morris, Rising Caseload, Fewer Labor Department Judges Triggers Painful Mix 
for Suffering Laborers, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/12/19/14035/rising-caseload-fewer-labor-
department-judges-triggers-painful-mix-suffering.  Notably, the Obama administration has 
included an additional $2 million in its proposed 2015 budget to hire more employees, 
including ALJs, for the DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges (“OALJ”) in hopes of 
tempering the backlog.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 105–9 (2014).  While an influx of 
money will assist in alleviating the backlog, lack of adequate staffing is only one reason for 
the problem.  Another, lack of representation, will be addressed in detail in this paper 
and could indirectly have a meaningful impact on the average duration of claims.  See in-
fra Part II.A.  
 74 Do I Need Representation?, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/appeals/how_to_
find_legal_representation.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 75 20 C.F.R. § 725.366. 
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ALJs.  While the DOL does not collect data on claimant representa-
tion,76 Program officials have cited “claimants’ lack of representation, 
particularly in the early stages of a claim, as a significant barrier to 
successful claims.”77 
Attorneys note the few financial incentives as the main reason they 
decline to take on black lung benefits cases.78  While the Program 
does have an attorney’s fee provision, those fees are contingent on 
success. 79  If the claimant is unsuccessful, then the attorney is not 
permitted to charge any fee for legal services.80 
Furthermore, litigating a black lung benefits case is a costly and 
potentially lengthy process.  As previously mentioned, the process 
takes three years on average from the initial filing to resolution.81  
The average three-year case costs approximately $18,000 and those 
lasting over seven years normally cost more than $70,000.82  The costs 
are predominantly from developing evidence, especially medical ex-
pert evidence, for use at hearings.83 
While the current low probability of success in black lung benefits 
claims is likely in part due to inadequate representation, the low suc-
cess rates combined with contingent attorney’s fees deter attorneys 
from representing claimants except on a pro bono basis.  As a result, 
a substantial number of miners are not represented when they file 
their claim or subsequently at a hearing or on appeal.84  Instead, the-
se pro se litigants must determine how to properly file a claim with a 
district director and then, when the operator requests a hearing, con-
vince an ALJ that technical medical evidence shows not only that they 
have black lung disease, but also that it was caused by mining em-
ployment.  In attempting to argue their case, claimants are generally 
opposing mine operators with vastly superior resources.85  As DOL of-
ficials have stressed the importance of representation in these pro-
ceedings, miners appear to be at a significant disadvantage as they 
 
 76 See GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 25 (noting that the DOL does not “track, evaluate, 
or report on claimants’ access to legal representation throughout the claims and appeals 
process”). 
 77 Id. at 26.  The GAO 2009 Report found that DOL and OALJ officials considered repre-
sentation to be crucial to successfully filing claims.  Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 20 C.F.R. § 725.367. 
 80 Id. 
 81 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 26. 
 82 Id. at 26–27. 
 83 Id. at 26. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 31. 
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both lack representation and confront a superiorly financed oppo-
nent. 
B. Claimants’ Limited Access to Medical Evidence 
The DOL’s February 2014 Guidelines, which expanded access to 
medical evidence for a limited number of claimants, were a direct re-
sponse to growing concern in Congress86 and from the public87 that 
miners lack adequate access to a key piece of evidence in administra-
tive hearings.88  As discussed in the previous section, claimants usually 
lack legal representation and, even if they know stronger medical ev-
idence would bolster their case, claimants normally lack the resources 
to seek out and obtain results beyond what the DOL provides.  The 
DOL-provided medical evidence, even after the 2014 Guidelines, is 
inadequate to give miners a fair chance in administrative proceed-
ings.  Claimants must rely on inferior resources that hinder their abil-
ity to successfully acquire benefits. 
Under the Act, the DOL provides all claimants with one medical 
examination, which includes a complete pulmonary evaluation and a 
doctor’s medical opinion on the basis of the testing.89  The 2014 
Guidelines, which make available a second examination and expert 
opinion, illustrate the DOL’s belief, at least in some circumstances, 
that a single medical review is not enough to succeed in a hearing.  
Indeed, in opposing a miner’s claim for benefits, operators often ob-
tain multiple medical opinions, but present only those that support a 
denial of benefits during administrative proceedings.  
 Medical evidence, including exams and medical expert opinions, 
is a crucial factor in awarding benefits.  This evidence not only sup-
ports whether a claimant has black lung disease, but also whether 
mining employment caused the disease.  Current science is not able 
to make a medical distinction between black lung disease caused by 
coal dust and lung disease caused by smoking.90 When a miner who 
 
 86 Recently, former Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Robert P. Casey, Senator Joe 
Manchin, and others sent a letter to DOL Secretary Thomas Perez emphasizing their 
concerns that the OALJ unfairly limited claimants’ access to medical evidence.  Letter 
from John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator, U.S. Congress, et al., to Thomas E. Perez, Secre-
tary, Dep’t of Labor (Feb. 28, 2014) (on file with author). 
 87 See Hamby, supra note 15 (noting the increasing concern with the Program and its treat-
ment of miners). 
 88 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 28 (noting that the DOL ALJs view medical evidence, 
especially medical expert opinions, as a “key element” in  determining whether a claim-
ant should be awarded benefits). 
 89 20 C.F.R. § 725.406(a). 
 90 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 22. 
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was also a smoker is seeking benefits, operators argue smoking, not 
breathing coal dust, caused the disease.91  Determining whether the 
miner’s disease is caused by coal dust or smoke inhalation is a com-
mon occurrence in administrative proceedings because of the high 
prevalence of smoking in areas where underground coal mining, and 
black lung disease, are also most prevalent.92 
The DOL-provided medical evidence is not only inadequate quan-
titatively, but qualitatively as well.  The GAO 2009 Report found:  
“According to some [DOL] [ALJs], mining company doctors are usu-
ally better credentialed and produce lengthier, more sophisticated, 
and comprehensive medical reports and evaluations” than claim-
ants.93  The report found that although “doctors’ medical opinions 
are a key element of evidence in claims adjudication” medical expert 
opinions “submitted by DOL’s approved doctors did not provide 
claimants with sound evidentiary support for their cases.”94  In re-
sponse, DOL doctors claimed that the Agency failed to provide clear 
guidance on how to document their findings and opinions.95 
While the DOL’s 2014 Guidelines providing an additional medical 
review does attempt to solve the evidentiary disparity between parties, 
and may prove somewhat effective if the quality of medical analysis 
improves, the scope of the pilot program’s application is too narrow.  
The exclusion of miners with less than fifteen years of mining experi-
ence is in tension with recent reports that the disease is becoming 
more prevalent in younger miners.96  Indeed, of the seventeen miners 
who died in the Upper Big Branch explosion with black lung disease, 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 West Virginia and Kentucky have, respectively, the most and second most number of un-
derground coal mines in the United States as well as the two highest smoking rates in the 
country.  The mines are highly concentrated in the Appalachian region within both 
states, which includes the eastern portion of Kentucky and southern portion of West Vir-
ginia.  The Appalachian region contains most of the nation’s coal mines generally, with 
Virginia, the next most populous area, having nearly a hundred fewer underground 
mines than Kentucky.  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2012, at 2–5 
(2013) (noting that West Virginia has the most underground coal mines in the United 
States with 160 and Kentucky has the second most with 150, with nearly all of these mines 
concentrated in the Appalachian region); see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 2012 CODEBOOK REPORT:  
LAND-LINE AND CELL-PHONE DATA (2013), available at 
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/brfss/list.asp?cat=TU&yr=2012&qkey=8161&state=All (finding 
that West Virginia and Kentucky have the two highest rates of smoking in the country 
with at least 25% of residents smoking from high school onward.). 
 93 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 21. 
 94 Id. at 28. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Laney & Attfield, supra note 10, at 430 (noting that black lung disease is more preva-
lent among mines with fewer than fifty employees, which tend to have younger miners). 
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five had less than ten years of mining experience and would not have 
been covered under the new guidelines.97 
Technically, claimants are not confined to one, or now in some 
instances two medical reviews even if cost would prohibit funding an 
additional analysis.  Claimants may obtain evidence prepared for trial 
from an operator, including copies of medical reports from non-
testifying experts, as long as miners can show a “substantial need of 
the materials in the preparation” of the case and that the claimant “is 
unable without undue hardship” to acquire substantially equivalent 
materials.98  Practically, claimants do not often use this mechanism 
likely due to their pro se status and lack of legal knowledge to suc-
cessfully win a motion to obtain non-testifying expert evidence.  This 
provision, however, has been used and leaves open an opportunity 
for claimants to narrow the evidentiary gap.99 
The DOL 2012 Proposal to harmonize the ALJ hearing practices 
and procedures with the FRCP would significantly alter this potential 
opening.  The proposed rule would change the standard to obtain an 
opponent’s expert evidence prepared for trial to what is currently 
FRCP 26(b)(4)(D)(ii).  Under the new rule, miners would be re-
quired to show “exceptional circumstances under which it is imprac-
ticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by 
other means.”100  By forcing miners to show the higher threshold of 
“exceptional circumstances” before obtaining non-testifying expert 
evidence, the DOL would effectively preclude miners from obtaining 
this evidence from operators.  A higher barrier to overcome in access-
ing crucial medical evidence, which otherwise would be out of the 
reach of claimants, would only further hinder miners from adequate-
ly proving their cases at a hearing. 
III.  REMEDYING PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 
PROGRAM:  ALLOWING SETTLEMENT AND PRESUMPTIVELY DISCLOSING 
NON-TESTIFYING MEDICAL EXPERT EVIDENCE 
The lack of claimant representation and access to adequate medi-
cal evidence significantly hinders the fair determination of benefits.  
Without a lawyer familiar with the Program’s process, claimants with-
 
 97 See GOVERNOR’S INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 1, at 32 (noting that the 
Upper Big Branch victims were a random sample of miners and that “71 percent of them 
show[ing] evidence of [black lung disease] is an alarming finding given the ages and 
work history”). 
 98 29 C.F.R. § 18.14(c) (1989). 
 99 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 26. 
100 December 2012 Proposal, supra note 59, at 72183 (to be codified at § 18.51(d)(4)(B)). 
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out any legal experience struggle to navigate initial determinations 
and hearings while being opposed by experienced practitioners with 
superior resources.  While the DOL attempts to provide claimants 
with basic evidence, a medical exam and expert opinion, this is inef-
fective in persuading judges when competing against an operator’s 
curated list of expert evidence, which is generally selected from a 
large pool including non-testifying expert opinions that may fully 
support awarding the miner benefits. 
In proposing solutions to these problems, the primary goal is not 
to increase the success rate of claimants or unfairly disadvantage op-
erators.  Indeed, the latter would only present a similar set of prob-
lems to a different party.  Rather, this part seeks to offer solutions 
that ensure operators can effectively defend themselves while also 
preventing miners from being overwhelmed solely by superior re-
sources.  With the goal of procedural fairness, it is crucial to elimi-
nate unfair barriers.  The achievement of complete procedural fair-
ness is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will argue that altering 
the Black Lung Benefits Program to allow settlement between claim-
ants and miners, and creating a presumption of disclosing non-
testifying medical expert evidence prepared for trial will move the 
Program’s adjudicatory process toward this ideal.101 
A. Allowing Settlement to Increase Access to Representation in Black Lung 
Benefits Hearings 
Lawyers cite cost, duration, and uncertainty of success as the main 
reasons for not representing claimants in Program proceedings.102  
An effective procedural solution should aim to address these com-
plaints while also ensuring the fairness of the adjudication process.  
Enabling settlement between claimants and workers in Program pro-
ceedings meets these criteria.  It will entice more representation 
through the mechanism’s potential for quick and efficient resolution 
of claims, which will create a significant decrease in the legal costs for 
both parties.  Whether settlement will actually occur is an empirical 
claim that cannot be adequately assessed before implementing a set-
tlement provision, but an opportunity for quick and relatively inex-
pensive resolution would likely prompt at least some operators and 
 
101 For an earlier and briefer formulation of these proposals, see Brandon Kenney, Achieving 
Procedural Fairness in Black Lung Benefits Hearings, REGBLOG (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.regblog.org/2014/08/14/14-kenney-procedural-fairness-in-black-lung-
hearings. 
102 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 26. 
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claimants to settle.  And regardless of whether claimant representa-
tion increases, pro se claimants will be in a better position to success-
fully acquire some form of payment as opposed to the current high 
rate of complete failure. 
Before discussing in detail the merits of a settlement provision, it 
is necessary to briefly describe how such a provision would function.  
As settlement provisions already exist in other federal103 and state104 
worker’s compensation schemes, these provide a template for a new 
Program provision.  Most provisions allow for settlement at any point 
after filing a claim, and the claimant usually receives a single lump 
sum payment as opposed to the Program’s monthly payment.105  In 
exchange for the settlement payment, claimants forgo any future 
claims against the company for the particular injury.106  My proposed 
settlement provision would follow this basic structure with the addi-
tion of an administrative review of the settlement.  The ALJ would re-
view the settlement agreement and all available evidence to ensure it 
fairly treats both parties and is in accordance with the public interest. 
This type of settlement provision would offer the potential of a 
relatively quick trial and lower both parties’ associated costs.107  Set-
tlement in other workers’ compensation programs is most likely to 
occur in the proceedings’ early stages,108 and, for example, would 
likely occur in Program proceedings during the beginning of the ALJ 
hearing.  While parties will still need to develop evidence to prepare 
for settlement negotiations and for a potential trial, it would be 
against a firm’s financial interest to initially spend a substantial 
amount of time and resources to oppose a miner’s claim when set-
tlement may not cost significantly more and provides less of a future 
financial risk.  Also, assuming settlement attracts greater rates of min-
er representation and that this improves claimants’ likelihood of suc-
cess, an operator’s risk of losing its opposition to granting benefits 
increases.  An increased chance of liability to provide a worker life-
 
103 See, e.g., Longshoremen’s Act, 20 C.F.R. § 702.241–43 (1995) (laying out the settlement 
provisions of the Longshoremen’s Act). 
104 See, e.g., David B. Torrey, Compromise Settlements Under State Workers’ Compensation Acts: Law, 
Policy, Practice, and Ten Years of the Pennsylvania Experience, 16 WIDENER L.J. 199 (2007) (de-
scribing workers’ compensation settlement provisions in Pennsylvania and other states). 
105 Id. at 208–11. 
106 Id. at 211. 
107 These trials will likely last far less than the average three years and, as a byproduct, have a 
significant impact on reducing the number of pending cases in front of ALJs. 
108 See Terry Thomason, Correlates of Workers’ Compensation Claims Adjustment, 61 J. RISK & INS. 
59, 66–76 (1994) (finding that workers are more likely to receive a settlement in the early 
stages of a workers’ compensation process as opposed to going through adjudication). 
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time medical benefits, combined with an opportunity for decreased 
legal costs and quick resolution would make settlement an attractive 
solution for operators.109 
Whether a new settlement provision will create a significantly fair-
er adjudication process, however, depends on attorneys’ believing set-
tlement is a potential outcome.  Attorneys previously thought that 
there was a low probability of success in Program claims, which was 
likely based on the historically low success rates of claimants, most of 
whom were pro se.110  As attorney’s fees are contingent on success, at-
torneys reasonably decline to represent claimants because of the low 
likelihood of remuneration.  But this low likelihood may actually be a 
product of inadequate representation.  The previous section dis-
cussed how having legal representation impacts claimants, forcing 
them to confront an operator with superior legal resources, and em-
phasized the ALJs’ belief that representation could assist claimants in 
effectively presenting their claims.  Whether legal representation will 
change miners’ rate of success is not within the scope of this paper.  
Rather, it is enough to conclude that lawyers will likely be enticed to 
represent claimants when the potential for a quick and relatively low-
cost proceeding is an option, and that this representation will give 
claimants a fair chance to present their case.111 
Even if I am incorrect that a settlement provision will lead to in-
creased claimant representation, pro se miners will still be in a more 
advantageous position to acquire some payment.  In providing set-
tlement as an option, pro se miners can leverage the operator’s po-
tential cost savings from not litigating the claim for multiple years in-
to an early lump sum settlement.  Regardless of whether the claimant 
is represented, settlement may be the financially optimal solution for 
an operator seeking to reduce cost and risk, and the best chance for a 
miner to receive any award. 
While settling a miner’s claim may be the best choice for opera-
tors and increase pro se claimants’ chance to receive any form of 
payment, the primary benefit of a settlement provision is not neces-
sarily that settlement will occur.  The major benefit is that the poten-
 
109 Even after implementing a settlement provision, operators should retain enough power 
that they would refuse to settle completely frivolous claims.  Indeed, an entirely frivolous 
claim should be relatively inexpensive to litigate, as costs related to expert testimony 
would be minimal because few expert opinions would be necessary for success. 
110 Again, the DOL does not keep representation records for ALJ hearings, but ALJ and 
DOL officials’ comments suggest pro se claimants are the norm in Program hearings).  
See GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 26–28. 
111 Additionally, the current attorney’s fee provision will need to be altered to allow attorneys 
to receive payment for legal services if a settlement is reached between parties. 
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tial for a settled claim will lead to greater rates of representation.  
This increase in representation may lead to a high percentage of set-
tlements, but it will also likely lead to more adjudications where 
claimants have legal counsel.  In either scenario, settlement or full 
adjudication, the increased prevalence of representation ensures 
claimants are able to present their cases in a more effective manner, 
which enables a fairer administrative determination of whether bene-
fits should be awarded. 
Many legislators and courts, however, argue that settlement in 
workers’ compensation programs is antithetical to the public policy 
concerns these programs were created to address.112 Critiques of set-
tlement provisions usually focus on three concerns:  (1) lump sum 
settlements will lead to a quick dissipation of funds;113 (2) once the 
settlement funds are gone, the worker will rely on welfare to sur-
vive;114 and (3) the worker lacks the knowledge to enter into a fair set-
tlement agreement.115 
These concerns are rooted in paternalism and a distrust of work-
ers’ ability to judge the best solution for their particular situation.  
Claimants without representation, however, will certainly be ill 
equipped to determine whether a settlement agreement is fair.  As a 
basic layer of protection, my proposed provision makes the ALJ a 
gatekeeper against operators taking advantage of claimants, which 
should protect against at least the most egregious agreements.116  Be-
yond the anti-paternalist sentiment that injured workers should be 
given the chance to determine whether to accept a settlement, these 
agreements in Program claims will objectively be a better outcome for 
claimants than what nearly 87% of them currently receive.  Especially 
in the black lung context, where scientific evidence struggles to dif-
ferentiate between black lung disease and severe smoking-induced 
 
112 See Torrey, supra note 104,  at 208–10 (noting the longstanding legislative and judicial 
opposition to workers’ compensation program settlement provisions). 
113 See id. at 208–09 (discussing several state cases where the courts stress settlement leads to 
“improvident investments”); see also Reeves v. La. State Prob. & Parole, 684 So. 2d 1112, 
1117 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (Lobrano, J., concurring) (emphasizing that workers’ compen-
sation laws are “intended to protect the claimant from the proverbial ‘lump sum’ of mon-
ey which may be squandered shortly thereafter leaving the out of work employee desti-
tute”). 
114 See Riesenecker v. Ark. Best Freight Sys., 798 P.2d 1040, 1041 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (argu-
ing that lump sum settlements “create[] a risk that the worker will need to rely on welfare 
during the time that periodic disability payments would otherwise be available.”). 
115 See Jacob Hartz Seed Co. v. Thomas, 485 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Ark. 1972) (“The employee is 
seldom as well informed in these matters as the employer or carrier.”). 
116 The proposed provision could also stipulate that settlement amounts would be dispensed 
monthly unless the claimant specifically requested otherwise. 
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pulmonary damage, it is reasonable for claimants not to want to risk a 
hearing where they could lose any chance at payment.  Furthermore, 
if this part is correct in assuming an increase in claimant representa-
tion via the settlement provision, miners will not be making the set-
tlement decision alone but with counsel and only after an ALJ has re-
viewed the agreement. 
By enacting a settlement provision, claimants will not only have a 
better chance of receiving payment but, more importantly, will entice 
lawyers to represent their claims.  This will give those represented a 
significantly better chance in hearings and on appeal to litigate 
claims against superiorly financed operators.  And although there are 
public policy concerns with settling workers’ compensation claims, 
these concerns are misplaced in the Program context.  The vast ma-
jority of claimants never receive any form of payment and, in the 
proposed provision, an ALJ would protect against operators attempt-
ing to abuse the provision. 
B. Expanding Access to Medical Evidence in Black Lung Benefits Hearings: 
Creating a Presumption of Disclosure 
While a settlement provision will increase claimant representa-
tion, a significant number of pro se miners will likely still seek bene-
fits.  In ALJ hearings, the key pieces of evidence are medical expert 
opinions and associated medical tests.117  As discussed previously, the 
quality of medical evidence is often the determinative factor for ALJs, 
especially in cases involving multiple potential sources of causation.  
As pro se claimants only have minimal access to this type of evidence 
provided by the DOL, operators with superior resources are able to 
selectively amass medical opinions that support their position while 
withholding non-testifying expert evidence.  This part proposes giv-
ing claimants greater access to medical expert evidence by creating a 
rebuttable presumption that parties are entitled to all opposing party 
medical evidence prepared for trial, including evidence parties do 
not intend to use at hearings. 
The current non-testifying expert evidence disclosure provision 
requires miners to show a “substantial need” of the evidence and that 
they would be unable to obtain substantially similar materials without 
“undue hardship.”118  The 2012 DOL Proposal would require a claim-
ant to show “exceptional circumstances,” an even higher threshold, 
 
117 GAO 2009 Report, supra note 15, at 28. 
118 29 C.F.R. § 18.14(c) (1989). 
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to obtain an opposing party’s evidence.119  As discussed previously, 
both of these approaches make it difficult for claimants to access po-
tentially crucial evidence.  In order to address this disparity in access 
to medical evidence, I propose altering the current provision to a 
rule that presumes the disclosure of medical evidence in ALJ hear-
ings.  It would require both parties, before an ALJ hearing, to provide 
the opposing party with all relevant medical expert evidence pre-
pared in connection with the case, unless the producing party shows 
that it would be unfairly prejudicial or overly burdensome to do so.  
Currently, parties do not often utilize the disclosure provision likely 
due to either claimants’ lack of knowledge that it is available or the 
high burden that must be overcome to access the evidence.  By shift-
ing the burden to the producing party, claimants, regardless of legal 
knowledge, will presumptively have access to this evidence. 
The expansion of available expert evidence would also allow the 
ALJ to better determine whether to award benefits considering all 
available evidence.  This would give the ALJ more than the claimant’s 
one or two DOL-supplied medical opinions and a selection of pre-
screened operator evidence.  Instead, highly relevant and high quali-
ty medical evidence may potentially be available at trial without in-
creasing the cost either party would have accrued otherwise. 
Although this provision would require a party, most likely the op-
erator, to provide an opposing party with evidence that may help its 
case, this does not destroy the adversarial nature of the process.  
While there is already a provision under which claimants may obtain 
non-testifying expert evidence,120 a substantial burden rests on the 
non-disclosing party to access the information.  Furthermore, the new 
presumption of disclosure is rebuttable if the operator believes dis-
closing the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial or overly burden-
some.  And even if the operator loses its rebuttal, the party can still 
explain the evidence at the hearing, offering reasons why other med-
ical evidence should be dispositive. 
Moreover, this will not cause parties to stop developing medical 
evidence for trial, as this type of evidence is often what determina-
tions are based upon.  The new provision would be narrowly tailored 
to only include medical evidence, such as medical tests and expert 
opinions.  All other evidence will continue under the current stand-
ard if a party seeks to acquire it.  This ensures the likely disclosure of 
 
119 77 Fed. Reg. 72142, 72161 (proposed Dec. 4, 2012) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 
18.51(d)(4)(B)). 
120 29 C.F.R. § 18.14(c) (1989). 
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evidence that supports a critical element of the claim and that is most 
often practically unavailable to a claimant due to its high cost. 
Admittedly, this will only provide assistance to claimants in the 
subset of cases where the operator has additional medical evidence 
from a non-testifying expert.  To further improve claimants’ access to 
medical evidence and ability to fully present their cases, claimants 
need multiple high quality medical tests and opinions.  Allowing ac-
cess to operators’ non-testifying expert evidence is the initial step, but 
this could be further improved.  These additional steps could include 
the DOL providing higher quality medical evidence and offering at 
least two examinations and opinions to a wider range of claimants.  
Furthermore, the previously proposed settlement provision will indi-
rectly increase access to medical expert evidence.  If there is an in-
crease in representation rates, it will likely lead to representatives in-
vesting more money in developing expert evidence in order to 
successfully settle or litigate a claim.  Regardless of other potential 
approaches, changing the expert evidence disclosure provision to 
one that presumptively discloses medical evidence between parties is 
an important move toward creating a fair hearing process for miners. 
CONCLUSION 
Horrific explosions such as those at the Upper Big Branch and 
Farmington mines rarely occur in the mining industry, but the ongo-
ing black lung disease epidemic continues to kill over 1,000 miners 
per year.121  As that number continues to grow, more miners will file 
for benefits through the Black Lung Benefits Program.  These min-
ers, however, will confront a Program with systematic procedural bar-
riers to the fair determination of their claims.  Two of the most press-
ing barriers were discussed in detail in this paper:  the lack of 
representation and inadequate access to medical evidence.  Most 
miners file claims pro se and struggle to present their cases against 
superiorly financed operators.  Furthermore, when miners present 
their claims they lack adequate access to what DOL officials and ALJs 
consider the key piece of evidence in most proceedings—medical ex-
pert opinions.  Instead of selecting from a pool of high quality medi-
cal expert opinions, the DOL provides claimants with only one or two 
relatively low quality medical exams and expert opinions. 
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This paper proposed initial steps to remove some of the proce-
dural barriers from Program administrative proceedings.  I first pro-
posed that a settlement provision would increase claimant represen-
tation by assuaging attorney concerns that Program claims are too 
costly, lengthy, and uncertain.  Instead of resolution taking on aver-
age three years and costing nearly $18,000, claims could be resolved 
within the first year for a fraction of the cost.  This increased repre-
sentation would allow claimants to better articulate their legal posi-
tion, both in settlement discussions and hearings. 
Realistically, even if representation rates increase some miners will 
continue to file claims pro se.  Although claimants’ representatives 
will likely pay for additional medical evidence to ensure a settlement 
or victory at a hearing, pro se claimants would still lack this crucial 
component of their case.  To remedy this disparity, I argued there 
should be a presumption of disclosing all medical expert evidence, 
even non-testifying expert evidence, between parties before hearings.  
Changing the expert evidence disclosure provision will increase 
claimants’ access to medical expert evidence without placing any ad-
ditional financial costs on either party and foster a fairer determina-
tion process where ALJs can consider all available evidence. 
Creating a settlement provision and revising the expert evidence 
disclosure rule are important preliminary steps toward removing sys-
tematic procedural barriers facing miners in claiming benefits.  The-
se changes will provide the foundation for a fairer determination 
process, one that allows miners to more fully and clearly articulate 
their legal positions while not hampering operators’ efforts to effec-
tively defend themselves.  As coal miners continue to suffer from 
black lung disease at increasingly alarming rates, a fair determination 
process will be integral to justly resolving their claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
